Hanlin Zhao (pronounced hAEn-lihn JOW)
I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Toulouse School of Economics. My research
focuses on Empirical Industrial Organization and the Digital Economy. I study how
information and search frictions shape consumer behavior and market competition, and
develop structural econometric methods to evaluate market design and regulation.
I was a Visiting Scholar at
NYU Stern School of Business in Fall 2025.
I am on the academic job market this year (2026–2027).
Industrial Organization·Digital Economics·Quantitative Marketing·Structural Econometrics
Research
Job Market Paper
Abstract
Online platforms often guide consumer choice through ranked lists. Consumers benefit
from a ranking ordered by consumer surplus, but the platform gains from steering them
toward high-commission offers. The platform's actual ranking balances these interests
through a weight on commission. Consumers learn about this monetization weight and
adjust their search accordingly, so the effect of steering depends on the gap between
the actual and perceived weights. Using Expedia data, we estimate a structural model
of consumer search and hotel pricing that separately identifies both weights. We find
that consumers substantially under-perceive monetization and overtrust the ranking.
Because steering distorts demand and price competition, regulators debate two
remedies: transparency corrects consumers' interpretation of the ranking, and
neutrality removes commission from the ranking's objective. We find that transparency
alone lowers consumer welfare, and neutrality alone yields a limited gain. The
policies are complements and combining them benefits consumers most.
TSE Online Seminar on the Economics of Platforms · TSE workshops
Working Papers
with Mathias Reynaert
and Wenxuan Xu
Abstract
Agents often choose based on expectations about uncertain attributes, yet researchers
rarely observe the information behind those expectations. We develop two methods to
estimate discrete choice models with heterogeneous, unobserved information sets. Our
point-identification approach uses repeated realizations of the uncertain attribute to
estimate its statistical process with observed predictors and recoverable latent
factors, then represents conditional expectations as a finite mixture over these
components. A complementary approach set-identifies preferences using partial
information about expectations. Both methods apply to individual- and market-level data.
Applications to firms' export decisions and consumers' automobile purchases show that
our method corrects for substantial bias in preference estimates that arises when
unobserved information heterogeneity is ignored.
IIOC 2025 · EARIE 2025* · APIOC 2024 · University of Vienna* · Northwestern University* · University of Helsinki* · TSE workshops
with Xin Zhang
Abstract
Pharmaceutical innovation depends on strong primary patents that allow originators to
recoup R&D costs. However, drug companies often engage in evergreening that prolongs
patent protection by filing follow-on patents with little therapeutic gain. We study a
policy lever that works with market forces to screen out weak follow-on patents: the
Hatch-Waxman Act, which incentivizes challenges to evergreening patents by granting the
first successful challenger a period of marketing exclusivity. We investigate how the
length of first-filer exclusivity shapes generic firms' incentives to initiate
challenges, which can curb the extra monopoly protection created by evergreening while
preserving incentives for genuine discovery and protecting consumer welfare through
earlier generic entry. Using a two-stage structural model that endogenizes challenge and
entry decisions, we estimate the fixed costs of generic entry with moment inequalities.
We find that the current 180-day exclusivity raises challenge rates by about 4
percentage points. Extending exclusivity primarily activates challenges in markets that
would otherwise go unchallenged: a two-year exclusivity increases the challenge rate to
15.38%. Effective exclusivity is highly heterogeneous across therapeutic classes:
reaching a 20% challenge rate requires roughly two years for antimicrobials but less
than one year for genitourinary drugs.
Northwestern University* · Kellogg School of Management* · TSE workshops
Specification Test for Models of Consumer Search
Abstract
Measuring consumer preferences requires knowing how consumers search. This paper
develops a search-conduct test that distinguishes sequential from simultaneous search
with differentiated products and outside options. The framework allows individual- and
product-specific search costs and observed or unobserved searched attributes. Estimating
both models with a unified maximum-likelihood approach, I develop a corrected Vuong test
to compare their fit. Monte Carlo evidence shows that misspecified search conduct
generates inconsistent preference estimates and that the test reliably selects the
correct model.
Draft available upon request
EARIE 2025 · Doctoral Workshop on the Economics of Digitization 2025 · TSE workshops
Work in Progress
- Identification of Consumer Search Models with Moment Inequalities
- Disintermediation, Platform Competition, and Ranking Algorithmswith Steve (Shitai) Zhang
- Ranking Competition under Two-Sided Learningwith Chuqing Jin
Teaching
Best Teaching Assistant Award, Toulouse School of Economics, 2023
Teaching Assistant, Toulouse School of Economics
-
Undergraduate Finance
in French
Spring 2024, 2025
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Graduate Econometrics
Fall 2024
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Undergraduate Econometrics
Spring 2023, 2024
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Graduate Empirical Industrial Organization
Fall 2023